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ABSTRACT
Governments across the globe have squandered treasure
and imprisoned millions of their own citizens by
criminalising the use and sale of recreational drugs. But
use of these drugs has remained relatively constant, and
the primary victims are the users themselves. Meanwhile,
antimicrobial drugs that once had the power to cure
infections are losing their ability to do so, compromising
the health of people around the world. The thesis of this
essay is that policymakers should stop wasting resources
trying to fight an unwinnable and morally dubious war
against recreational drug users, and start shifting their
attention to the serious threat posed by our collective
misuse of antibiotics.
The availability of cheap antibiotics has saved
countless lives, but it has also created a severe
public health problem. Since the diffusion of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria into our microbial
environment is a predictable side effect of the
widespread use of antibiotics, several authors have
described the use of antibiotics as a collective
action problem.1–4 Individual patients and physi-
cians may benefit (or believe they benefit) in the
short run by liberally prescribing and consuming
antibiotics, but all of us would be better off if anti-
biotics were reserved for relatively serious
infections.i
In contrast with antibiotics, the use of narcotics
does not create a collective action problem since
the relevant costs and benefits are borne by the
users themselves.ii Although many have argued that
recreational drug use harms non-users, most of the
harm associated with these drugs—such as theft
and murder—is caused not by drug use, but rather
by the enforcement of laws that prohibit drug use.
These laws create the conditions for black markets
to flourish, for violence to be used as a preferred
method of contract enforcement, and for police
corruption to thrive.5 6
In what follows I explore some morally salient
differences between antibiotics and narcotics, and
conclude that government action is both more
appropriate and more likely to be effective in regu-
lating antibiotics than it is in criminalising narco-
tics. I then suggest how we can regulate antibiotics
in a way that protects individual liberty and reduces
aggregate harm. More specifically, I argue that we
should implement a user fee on antibiotics which
would generate revenue for research into new ways
of diagnosing and treating bacterial infections.
ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS
Access to antibiotics creates a collective action
problem because the more we use them, the more
evolutionary pressure we exert on bacteria to
acquire and spread genes that confer resistance to
antibiotics into our environment. It is widely
understood that regions in which antibiotics are
most frequently used (especially when they are
used inappropriately) have the highest rates of
antibiotic-resistant infections.7
This suggests that preserving the efficacy of anti-
biotics is analogous to stewardship of the ocean
and atmosphere: without the right combination of
property rights or regulations in place, most people
will tend to ignore the costs they impose on others
because the costs are invisible and diffuse. I may
know, for example, that flying to Fiji rather than
Florida for my next vacation will produce more
greenhouse gas emissions. But I also know that the
pollution from my trip is not enough to signifi-
cantly contribute to climate change. In the absence
of price signals sent by a carbon tax, it is unlikely
that many people will make meaningful sacrifices
when the effects of their actions are relatively
small, diffuse and invisible. The choice to use anti-
biotics is structurally similar to the choice to use
pollution-emitting fossil fuels insofar as the benefits
of use are borne by the individual, the costs are
socialised, and the consequent harm is the product
of many independent actions.
One difference between using antibiotics and
pollution-emitting energy sources is that—whether
she knows it or not—the individual herself can
incur a significant portion of the costs associated
with antibiotics. These costs can include increased
virulence of non-susceptible microbes, colonisation
by opportunistic pathogens such as Clostridium
iPhysicians benefit from indiscriminate prescription by
saving time on diagnosis, and by acceding to their
patients’ (often uninformed) request for antibiotics;
patients benefit either because the antibiotics cure their
infection, or because they work as a placebo and make
patients feel as if something is being done, even if their
infection is viral, or would have cleared up on its own
anyway.
iiAlthough ‘antimicrobial’ is a more general term than
‘antibiotic’ (which designates only antibacterial agents), I
will follow common usage and treat the terms as
synonymous. For the sake of simplicity and style, I will
treat ‘recreational drugs’ and ‘narcotics’ as synonyms,
although technically ‘narcotic’ refers only to opiates and
other pain-relieving drugs. By ‘recreational drugs’ I mean
to include illegal narcotics such as heroin and marijuana,
illegal stimulants such as cocaine, and legal drugs that
people take to relieve pain, reduce anxiety, induce
euphoria, etc.
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difficile, and the persistence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in the
user’s body after completion of a course of antibiotics.8 9
Because genes that confer resistance are often cheap for bacteria
to retain, resistant bacteria can survive in the body for many
generations after antibiotic use has ceased.10 11 This is made
possible by compensatory evolution, and by the conditional
expression of resistance genes, which allows a bacterium to
economise on energy until antibiotic use resumes.12 Since resist-
ant bacteria can persist for so long, and since the genes that
confer resistance are easily transferred between different bacter-
ial species,13 people can bear at least two significant costs of
using antibiotics: colonisation by opportunistic pathogens, and
the creation of a personal reservoir of bacteria with
antibiotic-resistant genes.
This is important because it suggests that non-coercive solu-
tions to the problem of overuse may be more effective than they
would be if all of the costs of using antibiotics were externa-
lised. So far, however, efforts to inform physicians and patients
about the harmful effects of careless consumption have had
only a modest impact on behaviour.14 If physicians and patients
fail to act on the available information, or if the information
indicates that people do not incur enough personal costs from
using antibiotics to cause them to change their behaviour, the
basic collective action problem remains. Individually rational
choices produce substantial social costs by creating reservoirs of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in human hosts and more generally
in our shared microbial environment.
RECREATIONAL DRUGS
Does the use of recreational drugs harm others in similar ways?
I have already mentioned that most of the violence and crime
associated with narcotics is caused by laws that prohibit drug
use, rather than drug use itself, and thoughtful supporters of
drug prohibition agree.15 But some prohibitionists claim that
drug users are more prone to violence, dependence and poor
working habits, all of which harm other people. Other prohibi-
tionists add that pregnant women who use certain drugs put
their fetuses at risk,16 and that when adults have legal access to
narcotics, minors, who lack the ability to make fully rational
choices, will be able to access them more easily.15 They argue,
in effect, that leaving people free to buy and sell recreational
drugs creates large social costs.
These arguments should be taken seriously, but they do not
present a convincing case for criminalising narcotics. First, con-
sider the empirical evidence for the claim that drug users are
more likely to commit acts of violence. Many experts agree that
drugs do not directly cause users to become violent, except in
the sense that some drugs in conjunction with certain environ-
mental stimuli can reduce the inhibition of people already prone
to violence.17 It is important to be specific here, since even the
most ardent supporters of drug prohibition generally agree that
opiates and marijuana may actually reduce pre-existing tenden-
cies toward violence.16 It is often argued, however, that stimu-
lants such as crack cocaine and methamphetamine increase the
likelihood that people predisposed to violence will act on their
predisposition.
The claim that stimulants tend to make people violent is
often repeated but rarely supported with evidence. Experts on
psychopharmacological violence—violence induced by intoxica-
tion—suggest that it is difficult to get good statistics on the con-
nection between drugs and violence because there is a deep
problem in disentangling causation from correlation, and
because in many violent crimes it is not known whether the per-
petrator was intoxicated.18 The little evidence we do have,
however, suggests that alcohol (which is a depressant) is more
likely to reduce inhibition and trigger violent predispositions
than any illegal drugs,19 and most drug prohibitionists do not
think this gives us good reason to make alcohol consumption a
crime. Whatever reasons there might be to regulate alcohol—for
example, to make drunk driving illegal—few think its connec-
tion with violence gives us sufficient reason to criminalise con-
sumption. If this is true for alcohol, it should also be true for
other recreational drugs that are currently illegal and have a
much more tenuous connection with violence.
Consider next the emotional costs to friends and families
imposed by some drug users. We should first distinguish casual
users from addicts, since addicts constitute only a small percent-
age of users.5 Among opiate and amphetamine addicts, it seems
clear that the longer they remain addicted to drugs, the more
likely they are to neglect and alienate loved ones. But what
follows from this? Should we criminalise behaviour that may
lead people to disappoint their friends and family? There are
many ways we can disappoint people we care about, including
converting to Islam, working on Wall Street, or forgoing the
family business in favour of a career in pornography. These
choices may infuriate other people. But behaving in ways that
make people angry or disappointed is hardly sufficient grounds
for imprisonment.20 There are many ways our actions affect
others, and not all of these actions are, from a moral standpoint,
up for a democratic vote. If I choose to change professions or
switch my religious, political or sexual identity, those who are
disgusted by my choice may be ‘harmed’ in some sense. But this
is not the kind of harm they have a right to be protected from,
since this harm fails to undermine their basic interests.21
Similarly, some drug addicts may neglect their work or their
friends and family. However, the emotional cost they impose on
other people doesn’t justify us in treating them as criminals, or
forcing them to change their lifestyle.
A related argument adduced by prohibitionists is that drug
addicts are less productive workers than they would be if they
were sober, and that they harm others through their lack of
productivity.16 It is hard to know what to make of this claim. It
is true that opiates can make people less productive workers.
But few people would argue that we have a moral obligation to
be maximally productive workers, and that failure to do so
warrants an extended prison term or any other form of legal
punishment. There are many reasons people are unproductive—
boredom, depression, bad nutrition and chronic pain all come
to mind. To the extent that any of these are caused by bad
habits, they are character vices. But, as with most character
vices, social disapproval and friendly advice are more appropri-
ate, and often more effective at changing people’s behaviour,
than criminal punishment. To the extent that diminished prod-
uctivity is caused by addiction—to drugs, sex, food or anything
else—there may be good reason to encourage addicts to enter
rehabilitation centres. But this is a far cry from using state
power to imprison or otherwise punish people who buy or sell
recreational drugs.
Perhaps a more convincing case for criminalising the use and
sale of recreational drugs is that, in the absence of harsh penal-
ties, supply would increase, making it easier for adolescents to
access harmful drugs.15 Similarly, some say that increased
supply would make it more likely that pregnant mothers would
use drugs that cause harm to their fetus, and this justifies crimi-
nalising markets for recreational drugs.16 These arguments are
similar in the sense that the concern is to protect non-adults
who lack the capacity to voluntarily incur the risks of drug
use.
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But both arguments are specious. First, the evidence we have
from the only country that has decriminalised all recreational
drugs, Portugal, suggests that consumption has not significantly
increased for most drugs, and has actually declined for some
drugs.22 The evidence from Portugal shows that greater accessi-
bility does not necessarily lead to more drug use by either adults
or children. Second, if we are especially concerned to protect
fetuses from their mother’s drug use, it is inefficient to target
all drug users. Instead, we should try to make sure women
understand the risks associated with ingesting certain chemicals
—including alcohol, mercury, lead and cocaine—during preg-
nancy. Finally, it is unfair to treat all drug users alike when only
a small fraction of them harm others in morally relevant ways.
Imprisoning middle-aged men in order to prevent pregnant
women from causing drug-induced harm to their fetus is on a
par with imprisoning postmenopausal women for eating
mercury-rich seafood, which has the power to impair fetal
development in pregnant women. It is perfectly legitimate to
impose criminal penalties on people who distribute dangerous
drugs to children or knowingly harm a developing fetus. But
this does not justify using the power of the state to punish all
drug users.
Recreational drug users, then, fail to harm others in ways that
justify the use of government coercion to prevent them from
using drugs.iii When an adult decides to ingest a drug in order
relieve pain, reduce anxiety, or just have fun, the user bears
most of the morally relevant costs and benefits of his consump-
tion. When the same person takes a course of antimicrobial
drugs—especially when taking it to relieve symptoms that it
lacks the power to cure—other people with whom the consumer
shares a microbial environment may incur a great deal of the
cost of his consumption. Specifically, transmissible infections
resistant to antibiotics often kill people, or at least impair their
health and make their infection much more expensive to treat.
This feature gives antimicrobial drugs a fundamentally different
moral status from recreational drugs, and it suggests that current
policy priorities are based on moral confusion, scientific ignor-
ance, or both.
CHANGING COURSE
The choice to use antibiotics can affect others in positive and
negative ways. If one person uses an appropriate course of anti-
biotics, he may recover from an infection and prevent himself
from becoming a vector. But he also increases the risk of harm
to himself and others by increasing the prevalence of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in his own body and in the general
environment. Thus, Margaret Battin and her colleagues con-
clude that the choice to consume antibiotics ‘is partly a problem
of prudence, of considering apparent short-term benefits against
unknown but serious risks for oneself now and oneself in the
future; and it is also a collective action problem, because the
resistance one engenders in one’s own body may also affect
others’.23
In economic terms, the collective action problem stems from
the fact that the price of antibiotics fails to include the social
cost of resistance. This price distortion is exacerbated by health-
care systems in which third-party payers—including govern-
ments and health insurance companies—blind physicians and
patients to the full cost of treatment. When economists see price
distortions created by externalities, their first reaction is to find
a way to force consumers to ‘internalise externalities’—that is,
to increase the extent to which people bear the costs and bene-
fits of their own actions. Several ways of achieving this goal
have been proposed, ranging from consumption taxes and finan-
cial incentives to reward firms for conservation, to marketable
permits and patent adjustments for antibiotics.24 25 But because
bacterial evolution is unpredictable, and resistant bacteria are
invisible to the people who host them, the goal of fully interna-
lising externalities may be impossible to achieve, and ethically
undesirable.
What, then, should be done to minimise the collective harm
associated with antibiotic use? Scholars have reviewed a range
of policies that could work in conjunction to reduce the
problem of resistance. Educating patients and clinicians about
the nature and risks of antibiotics can go some way to reducing
careless consumption.26 We should also phase out the sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotics in farm animals,27 and forbid
factory farming more generally.iv This would help preserve the
efficacy of existing antibiotics for human use and reduce the
threat of zoonotic viral infections such as avian flu and swine
flu.28 For antibiotics to remain effective, we may also need to
incentivise pharmaceutical firms to conserve existing drugs29
and encourage developing nations to ban over-the-counter sales
of antibiotics. Finally, wealthier nations should be prepared to
share information and surveillance technology with developing
nations in order to monitor outbreaks of resistant pathogens.7
This would benefit people in all nations, and could help build
trust between leaders of nations that might eventually forge
more ambitious agreements to solve global problems ranging
from antibiotic resistance to climate change.
Another proposal would be for governments to impose a
Pigovian tax on each course of antibiotics that reflects the social
cost of use.30 Pigovian taxes attempt to reduce socially harmful
activities by raising the cost of those activities. In theory,
Pigovian taxes would diminish socially harmful consumption
(depending on the size of the tax, and on who pays it), and
provide a source of revenue that could fund basic science
research and provide compensation to victims of antibiotic
resistance. However, if the precise social costs (and benefits) of
consuming antibiotics cannot be calculated, and if those who
create and enforce public policy are imperfect agents for the
people who put them in power, we shouldn’t support a policy
that presupposes perfectly informed and benevolent government
agents. Accordingly, Battin et al suggest that, instead of a
complex system of antibiotics taxes, we should simply ‘add a
fixed amount, say a $1 surcharge to every course of a first gener-
ation antimicrobial, and a slightly larger surcharge—say, $2—to
every course of a second generation antimicrobial. Funds gener-
ated in this way could be used to support antimicrobial research
either by the government directly or through grants and con-
tracts’.23 Since the surcharge proposal hasn’t been fully devel-
oped, I want to consider in a little more detail why it’s a good
partial solution to the problem of antibiotic resistance.
First, a modest surcharge (or ‘user fee’) has some of the
virtues of a Pigovian tax without its vices. Like a Pigovian tax, a
surcharge can be flexible, but, unlike a Pigovian tax, it is a flat
fee and does not require us to perform the impossible task of
iiiWe might, however, justify publicly funded treatment centres, which
seem more effective (and more compassionate) than turning drug users
into enemies of the state.
ivIn addition to banning the sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics in
livestock, we might tax therapeutic antibiotics, which would drive up
the cost of factory farming, but still allow farmers to treat animals who
get sick through no fault of the farmer.
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calculating the precise social costs (or benefits) associated with
the aggregate use of a particular antibiotic drug at a particular
time. A surcharge reflects the fact that there are likely to be
social costs from widespread use, that the costs vary between
different drugs and different people, and that users of these
drugs should pay some kind of compensation to other people
for their use of an exhaustible resource. Unlike a Pigovian tax,
however, a surcharge would not raise the cost of antibiotics so
much that poor people who need them will be priced out of the
market. This is an advantage from the point of view of fair
access, but it may also be better for wealthier people since
everyone is better off when those who need antibiotics for a
transmissible infection can afford to finish a complete course.
Thus, antibiotics user fees strike a balance between the compet-
ing values of efficiency and fairness: they don’t require precise
calculations, and they keep the access fee low enough that poor
people will not be deterred from consumption that is both indi-
vidually and socially beneficial.v
A second reason for supporting a user fee (a reason that
could also be used to support Pigovian taxes) is that it is consist-
ent with an identity-independent conception of harm.31
According to the identity-independent view, we can harm
people who do not yet exist, or contribute to a chain of events
that predictably harms people even if it’s unpredictable which
particular people will be harmed, or how responsible we are for
causing harm. Since a single person’s use of antibiotics merely
raises the probability that he will become a vector for the trans-
mission of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, we shouldn’t think of the
harms associated with antibiotic use in the same way we typic-
ally think of harmful actions. If a bully bludgeons you with a
sledgehammer and watches you bleed to death in a dark alley,
he should be punished because he bears full responsibility for
your death. But many modern social challenges—including
threats to public health and our environment—require a funda-
mentally different way of thinking. My use of antibiotics may
lead to an increased risk of infection by another person by
subtly influencing the composition of our microbial environ-
ment. But in most cases there will be no direct causal link
between my use of antibiotics and another person’s compro-
mised health. Even when such links exist, they are generally
impossible to discover. Thus, rather than punishing people for
any particular harms associated with the use of antibiotics, we
should work with an identity-independent conception of harm,
and favour policies that increase the extent to which individually
advantageous actions also produce socially beneficial rather than
harmful outcomes. A user fee can do this by raising the marginal
cost of emitting genetic pollution through the use of antibiotics,
and by using revenues to fund research related to antibiotic
resistance, and conservation of existing antibiotics. A Pigovian
tax would accomplish the same end, but would suffer from the
drawbacks mentioned above.
A third reason for supporting a user fee for antibiotics stems
from the fact that some of the basic science research that pro-
duces fundamental breakthroughs in our understanding and
treatment of infectious disease is not profitable for pharmaceut-
ical firms to perform. This may seem counterintuitive. If the
global rate of antibiotic resistance is accelerating, and if treat-
ment of infectious disease creates new profit opportunities, we
should expect profit-seeking firms to develop new drugs to treat
emerging infections. However, there has been a well-
documented decline in the development of new antibiotic drugs
over the past few decades.32
One explanation for this is that most early antibiotics were
extracted from organisms that produce endogenous antibacterial
agents. This made them easy to discover and cheap to produce.
As resistance to these chemicals has become more widespread in
the bacteria that colonise us, many new antibiotics have to be
synthetically created in laboratories, and this process is so
lengthy and costly that some firms have abandoned their efforts
altogether. Another explanation for decreased investment by
pharmaceutical firms is that newer classes of antibiotics, and
novel ways of treating microbial infections, require basic science
research, which is not patentable, and therefore not profitable,
at least in the short term.vi To the extent that information
gleaned from basic science research cannot be patented, or is
not immediately profitable enough for firms to justify large
investments, it is a public good in the technical sense that its
potential benefits are both non-excludable and non-rival.33
Although some public goods can be supplied privately, as the
number of potential beneficiaries and the cost of producing the
goods increase, private provision becomes less likely and govern-
ment funding may be the only effective way to supply it. An
antibiotics user fee is a minimally intrusive way of increasing
public funding for basic science research which can be used by
private firms to develop new treatments for infections.
A user fee would not be a panacea. But it could be a crucial
part of a multidimensional approach to the problem of resist-
ance. User fees are especially attractive because of their fairness
and simplicity. Their capacity to deter socially harmful con-
sumption will be limited by the size of the fee, but the revenue
generated by even a modest fee may foster fundamental break-
throughs in resistance-related research, which—from a moral
standpoint—can be thought of as indirect compensation to
future victims of antibiotic-resistant infections.
CONCLUSION
I have assumed the liberal view that individual adults should be
free to make their own choices, even choices others consider
repugnant, provided they bear most of the morally relevant
costs. If, as I have argued, the choice to use recreational drugs
fails to harm others in morally significant ways, we should call
off the ‘war on drugs’ and consider more humane and less intru-
sive alternatives for helping drug addicts. By contrast, the use of
antibiotics creates a global, inter-generational collective action
problem in which the consumption choices of each person have
significant welfare effects on others. This suggests that there is a
much stronger justification for governments to regulate the use
of antimicrobial drugs than there is for regulating recreational
drugs. Yet in many countries around the world, antibiotics are
either sold over-the-counter or casually dispensed without much
consideration of the social consequences. Instead of a fully free
market for antibiotics, I have argued that we should think hard
about how to regulate them in a way that carefully balances
individual liberty and public health.
vAlthough supporters of a Pigovian tax cannot overcome the severe
information constraints faced by policymakers, they might solve the
problem of underconsumption by the poor by using some of the
revenue from a Pigovian tax to subsidise drugs for the poor.
viBasic science research is generally not patentable because most
governments and courts have denied claims of ownership rights over
fundamental insights about how the world works. For example, laws of
nature or mathematical theorems that describe the relationships between
quantum particles or the mechanisms of bacterial evolution are generally
left in the public domain so that individual firms and people cannot
withhold their discovery from others.
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